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 The screech of a siren disrupts a calm suburban neighborhood air 
as a police cruiser pulls up along the sidewalk. Two young men, 
unremarkable in most ways, freeze. An officer jumps out of the 
passenger side of the vehicle. Residents of the nearby apartment 
complex peer out their windows as the officer directs the men to place 
their hands above their heads. The officer recites the Miranda warning 
as he handcuffs the suspects. His partner opens the back door of the 
vehicle and they place the young men inside. 
The preceding paragraph details an arrest and nothing more. An 
inquisitive observer may ask themselves why these men were placed 
under arrest. Are they suspected of committing a crime? Are they 
guilty? Perhaps they just have the unfortunate luck of matching the 
wrong description? But the answers to these questions are not included 
in the paragraph above. The answers to these questions are irrelevant. 
Regardless of what the young men did or did not do, regardless of 
their eventual guilt or innocence, the two young men in the above 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
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scenario were placed under arrest. Had this arrest of taken place in the 
Village of Woodridge in early 2011, these young men would have been 
required to pay a $30.00 booking fee. They would have been required 
to pay this fee without any form of a pre-depravation hearing, and 
without any opportunity to challenge the fee or seek reimbursement.   
 In Markadonatos v. Village of Woodridge,1 the Seventh Circuit 
looked at whether this required booking fee was a violation of either 
procedural or substantive due process. The procedural claim hinged on 
opposing arguments regarding the risk of erroneous deprivation under 
the ordinance. The substantive claim turned on whether, and to what 
degree, the petitioner had standing. Judge Hamilton decried the 
“substantive due process detour,”2 stating that under the procedural 
issue the deprivation was always erroneous due to inability of the 
arrestee to contest the fee. In determining the question of standing for 
the substantive claim, the courts relied heavily on the issues of 
probable cause for the arrest and the petitioner’s eventual criminal 
proceedings. Judge Hamilton faulted his co-judges for their reliance of 
these facts as those matters remained irrelevant in the accessing of the 
booking fee.   
Judge Hamilton’s opinion that the booking fee was a violation of 
due process was correct and should have been adopted by the court. 
Requiring the payment of a booking fee upon arrest in the absence of 
any procedural process is a violation of procedural due process.  
The Seventh Circuit granted a rehearing en banc vacating the 
panel opinion, however, because no position by the en banc court 
commanded a majority, the judgment of the district court to grant 
Woodridge’s Motion to Dismiss was affirmed.3 
 Part I discusses the factual and procedural background of the 
Markandonatos cases, and will provide a brief history of procedural 
and substantive due process jurisprudence. Part II reviews the two 
district court opinions, the two Seventh Circuit opinions, and their 
                                                 
1 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos III), 739 F.3d 984 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
2 Id. at 995. 
3 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos IV), 760 F.3d 545 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
2
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corresponding concurrences and dissents relating to this matter. 
Finally, part III analyzes why Judge Hamilton was correct and why the 
Seventh Circuit should have adopted his analysis.  
 
I.    BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
On January 8, 2011, the petitioner, Jerry Markadonatos was 
arrested for shoplifting, an Illinois Class A misdemeanor, in the Village 
of Woodridge, Illinois.4 At the time, Woodridge had enacted Municipal 
Code 5-1-12(A), which imposed a $30.00 booking fee on any person 
subject to a custodial arrest.5 The Woodridge, Illinois, Municipal Code 
5-1-12 provided in pertinent part: 
 
“The fees for the following activities and purposes shall be as 
follows: 
 
A. Booking Fee: When posting bail or bond on any legal 
process, civil or criminal, or any custodial arrest including 
warrant $30.00.”6 
 
Woodridge collected this booking fee without any hearings, and did 
not offer arrestees any opportunity to challenge the deprivation or seek 
reimbursement.7 When Mr. Markadonatos arrived at the police station, 
he paid the booking fee, posted bond, and was released without being 
jailed.8  
Eventually, Mr. Markadonatos was ordered to undergo 12 months 
of court supervision and to pay fees and fines totaling $785 (not 
                                                 
4 Markadonatos IV, 760 F.3d at 545. 
5 Markadonatos III, 739 F.3d at 986. 
6 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos I), No. 11 C 7006, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3115, at *n. 1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2012). 
7 Id. 
8 Markadonatos IV, 760 F.3d at 545. 
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including the $30 booking fee).9 Upon successful completion of his 
supervision, Mr. Markadonatos charges were to be dismissed “without 
adjudication of guilt,” pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1(f).10 Despite the 
favorable adjudication, Mr. Markadonatos was never given an 
opportunity to contest the booking fee and Woodridge’s policy 
provided no means for a refund regardless of the outcome of the 
arrestee’s case.11 
 
B. Procedural Background12 
 
On October 4, 2011, Mr. Markadonatos filed a suit on behalf of 
himself and all of the arrestees who had been charged the booking fee, 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,13 arguing that Woodridge violated their 
right to procedural due process.14 On January 6, 2012, the district court 
granted Woodridge’s Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.15  
                                                 
9 Id. at 546. 
10 “Discharge and dismissal upon a successful conclusion of a disposition of 
supervision shall be deemed without adjudication of guilt and shall not be termed a 
conviction for purposes of disqualification or disabilities imposed by law upon 
conviction of a crime . . . .”  730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1(f). 
11 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos II), No. 11 C 7006, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83128, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2012). 
12 This section is meant to provide a brief overview of the procedural history of 
this matter. A more in depth look at the opinions and holdings in each case can be 
found in part II of this article. 
13 “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action 
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's 
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree 
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, 
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be 
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
14 Markadonatos II, No. 11 C 7006, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83128, at *1.   
15 Id. at *1-2. 
4
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Mr. Markadonatos was granted leave and filed his First Amended 
Complaint raising both procedural due process and substantive due 
process challenges.16 On June 11, 2012, that district court again 
granted Woodridge’s Motion to Dismiss.17 Mr. Markadonatos appealed 
to the Seventh Circuit arguing that the district court erred in 
dismissing his amended complaint.18 On January 8, 2014, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the ruling to the district court granting Woodridge’s 
Motion to Dismiss.19 Mr. Markadonatos petitioned for and was granted 
a rehearing en banc.20  
On July 21, 2014, the Seventh Circuit issued a divided opinion.21 
Judges Posner, Flaum, and Kanne interpreted Woodridge’s ordinance 
to apply only to individuals posting bail or bond and voted to affirm 
the judgment of the district court.22 Judges Easterbrook and Tinder 
also voted to affirm and opined that Mr. Markadonatos’ claim should 
be categorized as a substantive due process claim and that Mr. 
Markadonatos only had standing to contest the application of the 
ordinance to persons arrested with probable cause.23  
Judge Sykes voted to remand with instruction to dismiss the case 
for want of standing to sue.24 She opined that Mr. Markadonatos 
lacked standing to contest the application of the ordinance under either 
procedural or substantive due process claims since he was lawfully 
arrested with probable cause.25 The final four judges, Judges 
Hamilton, Wood, Rovner, and Williams, opined that Mr. Markadonatos 
had standing and voted to reverse the judgment of the district court.26 
                                                 
16 Id. at *2. 
17 Id. 
18 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos III), 739 F.3d 984, 987 
(7th Cir. 2014). 
19 Id. 
20 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos IV), 760 F.3d 545, 546 
(7th Cir. 2014). 
21 Id. at 545. 
22 Id. at 551. 
23 Id. at 554-55. 
24 Id. at 562. 
25 Id. at 556. 
26 Id. at 545. 
5
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Since no group constituted a majority, the district court’s judgment 
was affirmed.27    
 
C. Due Process 
 
The origin of due process dates back to the drafting of Magna 
Carta in 1215 in which clause 39 stated, “No free man shall be taken, 
outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed 
against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers 
and by the law of the land.”28 As early as 1354, the words “due process 
of law” were used in English statutes interpreting the Magna Carta.29 
By the end of the 14th century “due process of law” and “law of the 
land” were interchangeable.30   
This basic principle was incorporated into early state 
constitutions31 and eventually it was included in the Fifth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution which states that “No person 
shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law…”32 The Fourteenth Amendment further extended this principle to 
the states.33 
 
1. Procedural Due Process 
 
The Supreme Court has held that there are two steps when 
examining a procedural due process claim.34 First, the court must 
determine if there is a liberty or property interest within the meaning 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment that 
has been interfered with by the state.35 Second, the court must 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
29 Id. (citing 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354)). 
30 Id. 
31 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921). 
32 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
33 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
34 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
35 Id. at 332. 
6
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determine if the administrative procedures leading to the deprivation 
of the interest are constitutionally sufficient.36   
In determining if the administrative procedures are 
constitutionally sufficient, the court considers three factors: first, the 
private interest that is affected; second, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and any value 
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
government’s interest.37  
In Eldridge, the Court looked at whether the due process required 
the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing 
prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefit 
payments.38 A recipient whose benefits are terminated is allowed to 
seek reconsideration from the state agency after termination.39 Since a 
recipient is awarded full retroactive relief if they ultimately prevail, 
the private interest affected is only in the uninterrupted receipt of 
Social Security disability benefit payments.40 The Court noted that 
while the hardship imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability 
recipient may be significant, Social Security is not based on financial 
need and recipients still have access to private resources or other 
forms of government assistance should the termination of benefits 
place the recipient’s family below the subsistence level.41 Therefore, a 
brief interruption of benefits due to erroneous deprivation would not 
be so significant as to depart from the Court’s ordinary principle that 
something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to 
adverse administrative action.42   
In determining the risk of erroneous deprivation, the Court noted 
that the decision to discontinue disability benefits is determined by a 
medical assessment based on routine, standard, and unbiased medical 
                                                 
36 Id. at 334. 
37 Id. at 335. 
38 Id. at 323. 
39 Id. at 324. 
40 Id. at 340. 
41 Id. at 342. 
42 Id. 
7
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reports by physician specialists.43 Since the procedural due process 
rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth finding 
process of the procedures provided, the Court held that the potential 
value of an evidentiary hearing in this context would be minimal.44    
Finally, the Court looked at the government’s interest, which was 
the burden of the incremental cost resulting from the increased number 
of hearings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible 
recipients pending decisions.45 Since the resources available for social 
welfare programs are not unlimited and since it is unlikely that 
undeserved benefits would be recoverable by the Social Security 
Administration, the Court opined that the government interest would 
not be insubstantial.46 
The Court held that balancing these three factors an evidentiary 
hearing was not required prior to the termination of disability benefits 
and that the present administrative procedures, including procedures 
that provide recipients with an effective process for asserting their 
claim prior to administrative action, the right to an evidentiary hearing, 
and subsequent judicial review before the denial becomes final, fully 
comported with due process.47 In doing so, the Court noted that the 
essence of due process is the requirement that an individual in 
jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the case against him and the 
opportunity to meet it.48  
 
2. Substantive Due Process 
 
The Supreme Court has held that substantive due process protects 
fundamental rights and liberties which are so “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition,”49 that “neither liberty nor justice would 
                                                 
43 Id. at 343-344. 
44 Id. at 344. 
45 Id. at 347. 
46 Id. at 347-48. 
47 Id. at 348-49. 
48 Id. at 348.  
49 Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
8
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exist if they were sacrificed.”50 If the governmental practice does not 
encroach upon a fundamental right, the Constitution only requires that 
the practice be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.51 
Essentially, the governmental practice cannot be arbitrary or 
irrational.52  
 
II.    MARKADONATOS V. VILLAGE OF WOODRIDGE 
 
A. District Court’s Original Holding 
 
The original complaint alleged only that Woodridge violated 
procedural due process by imposing the $30 booking fee without 
applying appropriate procedures.53 Woodridge moved to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.54 Under the legal standard developed in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly55 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,56 a complaint must 
include sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its 
face. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.57 Thus, the district court 
applied the test set out in Eldridge to determine if Markadonatos’ 
claims, if true, made out a plausible procedural due process 
violation.58    
Since the parties agreed that Mr. Markadonatos had a property 
interest in his money the court moved on to the second step of the 
Eldridge test, determining whether the procedures regarding the 
deprivation of Mr. Markadonatos’ property interest were 
                                                 
50 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
51 Id. at 728. 
52 Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2003). 
53 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos I), No. 11 C 7006, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3115, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2012). 
54 Id. at *1. 
55 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
56 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
57 Id. at 678. 
58 Markadonatos I, No. 11 C 7006, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3115, at *3-4. 
9
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constitutionally sufficient.59 The court considered the three factors 
enumerated in Eldridge.60 
First, the court looked at Mr. Markadonatos’ private interest in the 
$30.61 The court concluded that the amount was small when compared 
to the types of interests that typically require a pre-deprivation 
hearing.62 Specifically the judge pointed to Sickles v. Campbell 
County63 and Eldridge in concluding that any monetary interest short 
of income constituting the sole means of an individual’s subsistence 
should only be given minimal weight.64 
Second, the court looked at the risk of erroneous deprivation and 
the potential value of additional or substitute procedures.65 Mr. 
Markadonatos argued that since an arrestee who paid the fee could 
later be found innocent or released without facing charges that 
erroneous deprivation is certain in at least some cases.66 The district 
court disagreed. Since the fee applied to all arrestees regardless of 
guilt, the court noted that the only risk of erroneous deprivation would 
be if someone who was not arrested was charged the fee.67 Since 
Woodridge administration made the determination that an individual 
was arrested, and thus owed the fee, at the time the individual was 
booked into jail, the chances of charging someone with the fee who 
was not arrested was zero.68 Further, the court noted that substitute 
procedures would not provide additional safeguards or decrease the 
already negligible risk of erroneous deprivation.69 
                                                 
59 Id. at *5. 
60 Id. at *5-6. 
61 Id. at *6. 
62 Id. 
63 501 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2007) (evaluating the private interest in room and 
board fees deducted from incarcerated individuals canteen accounts). 
64 Markadonatos I, No. 11 C 7006, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3115, at *7-8. 
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Finally, the court looked to the government interest in defraying 
administrative costs in processing arrestees.70 The court held that 
Woodridge’s interest was legitimate.71 However, like Mr. 
Markadonatos’ private interest in the money, Woodridge’s interest in 
such a small amount of money was also minimal.72  
Upon balancing these factors, the court determined that the 
dispositive factor was the nonexistent risk of erroneous deprivation.73 
The court held that since there was no risk that Woodridge would 
charge the fee to an individual who was not arrested, and since no 
alternative procedures would significantly decrease that risk, 
Woodridge’s current procedures were constitutional.74 Thus, the 
district court held that Mr. Markadonatos failed to state a claim that 
Woodridge violated his procedural due process rights.75 
 
B. District Court’s Holding on First Amended Complaint 
 
Concurrently with his first dismissal, the district court granted Mr. 
Markadonatos leave to amend his complaint.76 The factual allegations 
in the complaint remained unchanged but Mr. Markadonatos now 
brought both procedural and substantive due process claims.77 
Since Mr. Markadonatos did not add any additional factual 
allegations the court held that his procedural due process claim was 
barred by the law of the case doctrine.78 However, the court noted that 
even upon reconsideration, Mr. Markadonatos’ procedural claim 
                                                 




74 Id. at *11. 
75 Id. 
76 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos II), No. 11 C 7006, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83128, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2012). 
77 Id. 
78 The law of the case doctrine “expresses the practice of courts generally to 
refuse to reopen what has been decided.” Id. at *4. (quoting Messenger v. Anderson, 
225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912)). 
11
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would still fail.79 Mr. Markadonatos attempted to clarify his procedural 
due process claim by pointing out that the Eldridge test was meant to 
determine what procedures are required prior to deprivation, and 
should not be applied in a way the indicates the absence of any 
procedure at all is acceptable.80 The court pointed out that Woodridge 
did provide minimal process before charging the fee.81 Specifically, 
the court noted that the fee was applied at the time of booking and any 
individual would be able to point out any error at that time.82 The court 
noted that a person who was not actually under arrest would simply 
have to convey that information to avoid erroneous deprivation.83  
Next, the court examined Mr. Markadonatos’ substantive due 
process claim.84 The court noted that property interest in a $30 
booking fee was not a fundamental right, and thus the proper analysis 
under substantive due process for this case was the rational basis test.85 
The court noted that under the rational basis test, the court must ask if 
Woodridge’s practice of charging a booking fee to all arrestees, 
regardless of legality of the arrest or the disposition of the arrestee’s 
case, is arbitrary or irrational.86  
The court held that Mr. Markadonatos lacked the standing to 
challenge the rationality of Woodridge’s policy under the substantive 
due process claim for individuals who may have been arrested without 
probable cause or released without being charged because Mr. 
                                                 
79 Id. at *7-8.  
80 Id. at *8. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to 
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). 
81 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos II), No. 11 C 7006, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83128, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2012). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at *9-10. 
84 Id. at *10. 
85 Id. at *12-13. “[T]he Supreme Court has never held that a property interest 
so modest is a fundamental right.” Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th 
Cir. 2009). (explaining there is no fundamental right involved in a small sum such as 
a $90 traffic fine). 
86 Markadonatos II, No. 11 C 7006, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83128 at *13. 
12
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 4
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss2/4
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 10, Issue 2                        Spring 2015 
 
320 
Markadonatos was arrested with probable cause and was charged.87 
Instead, the court noted that Mr. Markadonatos could only challenge 
the rationality of the policy as it applied to individuals arrested with 
probable cause, charged with crimes, and subjected to conviction.88 
The court held that charging booking fees to such arrestees was 
rational since Woodridge had a legitimate interest in defraying the cost 
of such arrests, and it was rational for Woodridge to share the cost of 
incarceration with the individuals who, through their actions, 
necessitated those costs.89 Since Woodridge’s fees were rational as 
applied to Mr. Markadonatos, the court granted Woodridge’s motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim.90 
 
C. Seventh Circuit’s Panel Opinion 
 
1. Opinion of the Court 
 
After his second dismissal, Mr. Markadonatos appealed to the 
Seventh Circuit arguing that the district court erred in dismissing his 
amended complaint.91 First, the Seventh Circuit Court looked to the 
issue of standing.92 The court noted there are essentially three 
elements for standing.93 First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 
“injury in fact,” requiring an invasion of the plaintiff’s legally 
protected interest that is both concrete and particularized and actual or 
imminent.94 Second, the injury must have been caused by the conduct 
complained of.95 Third, it must be likely that a decision in the 
plaintiff’s favor would redress his injury.96 
                                                 
87 Id. at *13-14. 
88 Id. at *14.  
89 Id. at *14-15. 
90 Id. at *15. 
91 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos III), 739 F.3d 984, 987 
(7th Cir. 2014). 
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The court held that Mr. Markadonatos had standing to bring a 
procedural due process claim because he had pled that he was 
deprived of $30 without a legally adequate opportunity to challenge 
that deprivation.97 Next the court looked to Mr. Markadonatos’ 
standing to bring a substantive due process claim.98 Unlike the district 
court, the Seventh Circuit opinion recognized that Mr. Markadonatos 
eventual conviction and adjudication were irrelevant as the fee was 
collected on the basis of arrest and not on subsequent guilt.99 However, 
the court held that the fact Mr. Markadonatos was a for-cause arrestee 
was relevant, and thus Mr. Markadonatos only had standing as an 
individual arrested with probable cause.100 
The court then analyzed Mr. Markadonatos’ procedural due 
process claim using the Eldridge test.101 The Seventh Circuit agreed 
with the district court that Mr. Markadonatos had some interest in his 
money, even if that interest need only be given minimum weight.102  
The Seventh Circuit also agreed with the district court that the risk 
of erroneous deprivation was practically non-existent since the fee was 
charged to all arrestees regardless of probable cause.103 The court 
opined that a Woodridge employee determining whether to charge a 
booking fee is presented with a binary choice, if the person was 
arrested charge the fee, and if the person was not arrested do not 
charge the fee.104 Since the collection of the fee occurred as the 
arrestee was being booked, the court said it could not envision any 
situation in which a person who was not arrested would be charged the 
booking fee.105 Thus, the potential for erroneous deprivation was 
practically non-existent.106 The court also noted that any additional 
procedures would not reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation and 
                                                 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 




103 Id. at 989-90. 
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would be largely meaningless since such a hearing would only need to 
establish that the arrestee was arrested and booked.107  
Finally, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that 
Woodridge had an interest in offsetting costs associated with detaining 
arrestees.108 Further, the court noted Woodridge had an interest in 
avoiding additional hearings before or after taking the fee because 
such administrative procedure would entail substantial additional 
costs.109  
Upon balancing the Eldridge factors, the court held that 
Woodridge’s interest in covering booking costs outweighed Mr. 
Markadonatos’ interest in his $30, especially when considering the low 
likelihood of erroneous deprivation.110 The court noted that this 
holding was consistent with the opinions of other circuits which have 
determined that routine accounting and deduction of fees from 
detainees is not constitutionally problematic due to the low amount of 
discretion and minimal risk of error.111 Additionally, although the 
ordinance didn’t formally provide an opportunity to challenge the fee 
or seek reimbursement, the court opined that an arrestee could argue to 
the arresting officer or later to a judge that the fee should not be 
charged to them or should be returned.112 Finally, the court noted that 
even if there was some potential for erroneous deprivation, for 
example in instances of false arrest, other state remedies were 
available to address such wrongs under which arrestees would be 
entitled to the return of their booking fee.113 




110 Id. at 991. 
111 Id. (citing to Sickles v. Campbell Cnty, 501 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2007); Slade 
v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2005); Tillman v. Lebanon City 
Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2000)). However, the court failed to mention 
that Sickles and Tillman dealt with inmates who had already been convicted and thus 
had already received adequate procedural due process, and Slade dealt with pretrial 
detainees who were entitled to a refund if acquitted of charges.  
112 Id. 
113 Id. (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Doherty v. City of 
Chicago, 75 F.3d 318 (7th Cir. 1996)). Here the court failed to note that these cases 
15
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Moving on to the substantive due process claim, the court 
reiterated that Mr. Markadonatos only had standing to the extent 
Woodridge’s fee applied to him, as a for-cause arrestee.114 The Seventh 
Circuit agreed with the district court that a $30 fee was extremely 
modest and did not rise to the level of a fundamental right.115 
Therefore, the court needed only to determine if Woodridge’s booking 
fee was rational and not arbitrary.116  
The court held that Woodridge’s fee passed the rational basis 
test.117 First, offsetting costs of booking arrestees was a legitimate 
state interest.118 Second, collecting fees from for-cause arrestees was 
rationally related to that goal as it took the fee from the individuals 
whose actions created the cost.119  
Therefore, the court held that Woodridge’s booking fee did not 
violate procedural or substantive due process and affirmed the district 
court’s decision.120 
 
2. Judge Sykes’ Concurring Opinion 
  
Judge Sykes’ concurring opinion specifically pointed out that the 
crux of Mr. Markadonatos’ substantive due process claim was that it 
applied to everyone arrested regardless of whether the arrest was 
lawful or resulted in criminal prosecution.121 Judge Sykes agreed with 
the district court that Mr. Markadonatos lacked standing to claim the 
booking fee was substantively unconstitutional because it applied to 
                                                                                                                   
dealt with deprivation caused by a state employee’s random, unauthorized conduct. 
“Hudson represent[s] a special case of the general Mathews v. Eldridge analysis, in 
which postdeprivation tort remedies are all the process that is due, simply because 
they are the only remedies the State could be expected to provide.” Zinermon v. 
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990).  
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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all arrested persons, whether or not the arrest was lawful, since Mr. 
Markadonatos admitted he was lawfully arrested.122  
Judge Sykes characterized Judge Hamilton’s dissent as believing 
that the booking fee was a criminal fine that required some sort of 
criminal prosecution before being applied.123 Judge Sykes believed 
that this argument was about the content of Woodridge’s ordinance and 
thus was a substantive challenge to the village’s policy.124 While she 
agreed such a claim would be valid, she maintained that Mr. 
Markadonatos lacked the standing to bring such a claim due to his 
arrest for-cause.125  
 
3. Judge Hamilton’s Dissenting Opinion 
  
Judge Hamilton’s dissent argued splitting the claim into both 
procedural and substantive due process claims had unnecessarily 
complicated the case.126 Judge Hamilton also opined that the majority 
was confusing standing with the merits.127 He argued that making the 
fee payable upon conviction, after the full procedural protections of 
the criminal justice system, did not indicate a substantive issue as 
Judge Sykes believed, but was simply a correction to a facially 
unconstitutional law.128  
 Judge Hamilton opined that the Eldridge framework requires any 
booking fee to await the outcome of a criminal prosecution.129 Under 
Woodridge’s ordinance, the final deprivation of property was based on 
the decision of a single police officer.130 Thus, the fundamental due 
process violation inherent in Woodridge’s ordinance giving one police 
officer the power to inflict property deprivation could not be explained 
                                                 
122 Id. at 993. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 




129 Id. at 994. 
130 Id. 
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away by using the Eldridge balancing test.131 The majority’s 
application of the Eldridge test provided circular logic: because the fee 
is imposed on all arrestees, there is no need for procedure because 
there is essentially no risk of error.132 The majority’s analysis erred 
because they failed to appreciate that the booking fee was in essence a 
criminal fine.133 
 Judge Hamilton opined that the Eldridge framework required any 
booking fee await the outcome of a criminal prosecution.134 Applying 
the Eldridge test, first, Judge Hamilton stated a person’s interest in 
their property is protected regardless of the amount.135 Second, the risk 
of erroneous deprivation is substantial because the pivotal decision 
that imposes the deprivation of property is a lone police officer’s 
decision to arrest.136 Judge Hamilton pointed out that in no other 
context, even a minor speeding ticket, is a police officer able to 
impose a fine without judicial review.137 Finally, Woodridge’s interest 
can only be in charging the booking fee to individuals convicted of a 
crime.138 Since the fee is charged at the time of arrest regardless of 
conviction, Woodridge’s interest evaporates.139 Additionally, the cost 
for Woodridge to await the outcome of criminal charges before 
imposing the fee would be marginal.140 
 Judge Hamilton then addressed Judge Sykes opinion that Mr. 
Markadonatos’ claim is correctly categorized as a substantive due 
process claim.141 Substantive due process does not prevent the 
government from imposing a fine or fee, including a booking fee, as 
part of a punishment for a crime.142 However, as Judge Hamilton 








138 Id. at 995. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 995-96. 
142 Id. at 995. 
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pointed out, the issue in this case is the lack of procedure in imposing 
that fine.143 Judge Hamilton’s objection was not with the content of 
Woodridge’s ordinance because it imposed a fee, but with the content 
of the ordinance because it denied procedural protection.144  
 The basic principle of due process is that a person may not be 
punished for a crime until a neutral fact-finder determines that the 
elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.145 
The proof happens through the processes of the criminal justice 
system, and not when a police officer makes an arrest.146 An officer is 
not entitled to impose judgment and punishment.147 However, 
Woodridge’s booking fee allows an officer to impose just such a 
punishment.148 As the district court and majority opinion noted, the 
governmental interest is in recovering administrative costs of booking 
from the individuals whose actions caused the costs.149 By assuming 
that the arrestee’s actions caused the cost, the majority essentially 
assumes that the arrestee is guilty of the crime, bypassing the question 
to be decided in the criminal justice process.150 
 As Judge Hamilton pointed out, the majority failed to explain why 
Mr. Markadonatos’ for-cause arrest was relevant when such 
circumstances do not matter under Woodridge’s ordinance.151 Since 
every arrestee is deprived of their property at the moment of booking, 
and since there is no provision in the law for further process or post-
deprivation remedy, every arrestee’s right not to be deprived of 
property without due process is violated at the moment of booking, 
regardless of whether the arrest was with or without probable cause.152 
Although probable cause is a complete defense to a federal 
                                                 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 996. 
145 Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 
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constitutional claim for wrongful seizure of a person and a state law 
claim for false arrest, courts have never suggested that probable cause 
is a sufficient basis for imposing a criminal fine without the further 
procedural protections of the criminal justice system.153 
 Additionally, Judge Hamilton disagreed with the majority that 
other state post-deprivation remedies may be sufficient to satisfy due 
process.154 Judge Hamilton pointed to Logan v. Zimmerman Brush 
Co.155, which held that a post-deprivation remedy did not satisfy due 
process where the property deprivation was effected pursuant to 
established government procedures.156 Judge Hamilton also noted that 
the amount of property taken was too modest for any other remedy to 
be meaningful without the help of a class action.157 The filing fee 
alone for a modest civil claim in the DuPage County courts is $150.158 
 Thus, Judge Hamilton explained that when properly understood 
Woodridge’s booking fee violated the due process rights of all 
arrestees, and he voted to reverse the judgment of the district court and 
remand for further proceedings.159 
 
D. Seventh Circuit’s Rehearing en Banc 
 
 After losing on appeal, Mr. Markadonatos petitioned for rehearing 
en banc and his petition was granted.160 Five judges voted to affirm the 
judgment of the district court.161 Judge Sykes voted to remand with 
instructions to dismiss for want of standing to sue.162 The remaining 
four judges voted to reverse.163 Since no position commanded a 
                                                 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). 
156 Markadonatos III, 739 F.3d at 998. 
157 Id.  
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 1001. 
160 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos IV), 760 F.3d 545, 546 
(7th Cir. 2014). 
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majority, the judgment of the district court was affirmed by the divided 
court.164 
 
1. Judge Posner’s Concurring Opinion 
 
Judge Posner, joined by Judges Flaum and Kanne, voted to affirm 
the judgment of the district court.165 Although both Mr. Markadonatos 
and Woodridge interpreted the ordinance to mean that a person must 
pay a $30 fee if they are arrested or, alternatively, if they post bail or 
bond in respect of some other form of legal process, Judge Posner 
argued that this was not the correct interpretation of the ordinance.166 
The language of the ordinance read that a person must pay the fee 
“when posting bail or bond on any legal process, civil or criminal, or 
any custodial arrest including warrant.”167 Judge Posner argued this to 
mean that an individual must only pay when posting bail or bond in 
connection with any legal process, including a custodial arrest.168 
Judge Posner admitted that this interpretation makes the “custodial 
arrest” clause of the ordinance redundant, but he attributed this to poor 
draftsmanship.169  
In reaching this opinion, Judge Posner pointed to Supreme Court 
precedent decisions regarding avoidance of statutory interpretations 
that raise serious constitutional issues.170 In the words of Justice 
Holmes, “the rule is settled that as between two possible 
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be 
unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that 
which will save the Act.”171 
                                                 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 




170 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring); Crowell 
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
171 Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 148 (Holmes, J., concurring). 
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Judge Posner argued that the fee was not a booking fee for 
individuals who were arrested, but instead was a governmental service 
fee for the benefit bestowed upon an individual who used the bail or 
bond system to avoid spending time in jail.172 Judge Posner noted that 
it was too late to save the ordinance by invoking the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance since Woodridge had already repealed it.173 
Judge Posner also admitted that using this interpretation may raise 
serious questions concerning the conduct of the Woodridge police if 
they were indeed charging the $30 fee to individuals who were 
arrested and did not post bail or bond, and that such individuals may 
have state or federal remedies available.174 However, Judge Posner 
pointed out that Mr. Markadonatos posted bond and was released, and 
therefore, he was not a victim of Woodridge’s policy outside of the 
ordinance.175 Additionally, Mr. Markadonatos only challenged the 
ordinance and not the policy that existed apart from it.176  
Since Judge Posner’s interpretation rendered the ordinance 
constitutional, it left no basis for Mr. Markadonatos’ claim.177 Judge 
Posner admitted the Seventh Circuit had no authority to give a state 
statute or local ordinance a definitive interpretation, but it remained 
the court’s duty to foresee as best they could the interpretation that the 
state courts would adopt.178 
Thus, Judge Posner opined that the case was properly dismissed 
on the pleadings, because the ground for the dismissal was the answer 
to a question of law.179 
                                                 
172 Markadonatos IV, 760 F.3d at 547. 
173 Id. at 550. 
174 Id. at 551. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 551-52. 
178 Id. at 552. 
179 Id. 
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2. Judge Easterbrook’s Concurring Opinion 
 
Judge Easterbrook, joined by Judge Tinder, concurred in the 
judgment to affirm the judgment of the district court.180 Judge 
Easterbrook agreed with Judge Sykes that Mr. Markadonatos lacked 
standing to contest the application of the ordinance to persons arrested 
without probable cause.181 However, Judge Easterbrook declined to 
join Judge Sykes’ opinion, which voted to dismiss the entire suit for 
want of justiciable controversy, because Mr. Markadonatos had 
standing to contest the ordinance’s application to a person arrested 
with probable cause.182  
First, Judge Easterbrook acknowledged that if forced to make an 
independent assessment of the ordinance’s meaning, he would agree 
with Judge Posner.183 However, Judge Easterbrook pointed out that 
only a state court can give an authoritative limiting construction to a 
local ordinance, and the Seventh Circuit’s task is to resolve the dispute 
brought before them.184 Since both parties agree that the ordinance 
imposed a fee on all arrests, the only justiciable subject is whether the 
Constitution allows the ordinance’s application to someone arrested 
with probable cause.185 
Next, Judge Easterbrook noted that probable cause justifies 
substantial burdens.186 Thus, a $30 fee is not constitutionally excessive 
                                                 
180 Id.  
181 Id. at 553. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982) (“[A] 
person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that 
statute on the ground that it may conceivable be applied unconstitutionally to others 
in situations not before the Court.”)). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id.  
185 Id. 
186 Id. (citing Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (Someone arrested 
with probable cause can be taken to the stationhouse, booked, and held pending bail, 
even if the offense is punishable only by fine); Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 
44 (1991) (A person arrested with probable cause can be held as long as 48 hours 
before seeing a magistrate); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (Probable 
cause reflected in a grand jury’s indictment justifies holding a defendant in custody 
pending trial); Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014) (Probable cause can 
23
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in light of deprivations of liberty allowable under arrests with probable 
cause.187 Although the Due Process Clause applies to both liberty and 
property, when there is a distinction, property receives less 
protection.188  
Judge Easterbrook failed to recognize any procedural due process 
claim, noting that Mr. Markadonatos may have been entitled to a 
hearing (or other informal process) adequate to separate persons 
arrested with probable cause from persons arrested without.189 
However, since Mr. Markadonatos maintained that the ordinance 
imposes a fee on every arrest, making probable cause irrelevant, and 
Mr. Markadonatos concedes his arrest, there is nothing to hold a 
hearing about.190 Thus, Judge Easterbrook opined that Mr. 
Markadonatos’ argument is correctly identified as a substantive due 
process issue.191 
Judge Easterbrook went on to note that Mr. Markadonatos does 
not have a fundamental right in his $30.192 Judge Easterbrook states 
that Washington v. Glucksberg193 separates the domains of equal 
protection and substantive due process.194 Since Mr. Markadonatos 
does not have a fundamental right in his $30, the equal protection 
question in this matter is whether it is possible to imagine a rational 
basis for the ordinance.195 Judge Easterbrook notes that arrestees may 
                                                                                                                   
justify the seizure of the suspect’s assets pending forfeiture, thus making it 
impossible for the suspect to hire his preferred lawyer and might lead to a 
conviction, when a better defense could have produced an acquittal)). 
187 Id. at 553-54. 
188 Id. at 554. (Criminal trials require a burden of “beyond a reasonable doubt,” 
whereas civil trials require only a “preponderance of the evidence,” and defendants 
are entitled to counsel at public expense in a criminal trial if they cannot afford a 





193 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
194 Markadonatos IV, 760 F.3d at 555. 
195 Id. at 554. 
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be released without charge, released on bail, or incarcerated, but any 
of those options would similarly cost Woodridge at least $30 in terms 
of paperwork and compensation for police officers.196 Judge 
Easterbrook states that requiring individuals to reimburse others for 
the costs they impose is rational.197 
Judge Easterbrook concluded that Mr. Markadonatos had standing 
to challenge the collection of a fee from a person arrested with 
probable cause, but that his argument failed on the merits.198 
Therefore, Judge Easterbrook concurred in the judgment to affirm the 
judgment of the district court.199 
 
3. Judge Sykes’ Dissenting Opinion 
 
Judge Sykes summarized the different opinions of the en banc 
court by noting that they could not agree on what questions this case 
raised, whether Mr. Markadonatos was the right person to raise them, 
whether they had been properly preserved, or what doctrinal 
framework applied.200 Judge Sykes maintained that Mr. Markadonatos 
lacked standing on the key substantive aspect of his due process claim, 
that it is irrational to impose the fee on individuals wrongly arrested, 
since Mr. Markadonatos was not wrongly arrested.201 Additionally, 
                                                 
196 Id. at 555. 
197 Id. Judge Easterbrook notes that when a person is arrested with probable 
cause their own misconduct is the cause of the costs incurred by Woodridge. 
However, this conclusion is wholly untrue and unsupported. Take for example an 
individual who is arrested for matching the description of a known burglar, however 
soon after his arrest the actual burglar is caught and the originally arrestee is 
released. Such an arrest would still fall under probable cause. But what misconduct 
has the arrestee done to cause the costs incurred in his arrest? Is it now misconduct 
simply to look too much like someone else? Judge Easterbrook fails to answer, or 
even acknowledge these questions. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 556. 
201 Id. 
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Judge Sykes now believed that Mr. Markadonatos lacked standing on 
the procedural due process claim as well.202 
Judge Sykes stated that Mr. Markadonatos conflated the 
procedural and substantive aspects of his due process claim in his 
initial brief on appeal.203 Mr. Markadonatos argued the fee was 
procedurally unconstitutional because it was collected without a pre-
deprivation hearing to test the validity of the arrest or a post-
deprivation process by which individuals wrongfully arrested, never 
charged, or found not guilty could obtain a refund.204 Judge Sykes 
opined that the way Mr. Markadonatos framed his procedural claim 
required a prior conclusion about the substance of the ordinance.205 
Judge Sykes explained that because the ordinance did not make the fee 
contingent on a valid arrest or successful prosecution, in order to 
resolve the argument about inadequate procedural process the court 
had to first conclude that the booking fee was substantively 
unconstitutional as applied to people who are wrongfully arrested, 
never charged, or found not guilty.206 However, Mr. Markadonatos 
isn’t in any of those groups, as he was arrested with probable cause, 
was charged with retail theft, and pleaded guilty as charged.207  
Judge Sykes noted that Mr. Markadonatos’ arguments had evolved 
during the course of the appeal, but essentially he maintained three 
possible reasons why the booking fee ordinance should be found 
unconstitutional: first, the fee was collected without a pre-deprivation 
hearing or post-deprivation process to obtain a refund; second, the fee 
was arbitrary and irrational as applied to individuals unlawfully 
arrested; and third, the fee was arbitrary and irrational as applied to 
individuals who were never charged or were found not guilty.208 The 
                                                 
202 Id. 





208 Id. at 559. 
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first argument is about procedure, and the other two arguments address 
the substantive terms of the ordinance.209 
Judge Sykes opined since Mr. Markadonatos conceded probable 
cause to arrest and admitted his guilt in court, he lacks standing to 
bring the substantive due process claim as it pressed an argument that 
the fee was irrational as applied to innocent or wrongfully arrested 
individuals.210 
Additionally, Judge Sykes summarized Mr. Markadonatos’ 
procedural claim as arguing that because the fee was not rational as 
applied to those who are wrongfully arrested, never charged, or found 
not guilty, a hearing is needed to prevent erroneous application to 
individuals in those groups.211 Judge Sykes opined that since Mr. 
Markadonatos was not a member of any of these groups, he had failed 
to prove the second element of standing because he had not suffered a 
harm that was fairly traceable to the alleged deprivation of procedure 
about which he complained.212  
Judge Sykes disagreed with Judge Easterbrook’s opinion that Mr. 
Markadonatos had standing to contest the ordinance’s application to a 
person arrested with probable cause under substantive due process 
because Mr. Markadonatos had never argued that the booking fee was 
arbitrary and irrational in all circumstances, but instead, he had only 
argued that the fee could not be rationally applied to persons 
wrongfully arrested or innocent.213  
                                                 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. Assuming this is an accurate summarization of Mr. Markadonatos’ 
procedural due process argument, Judge Sykes opinion had some merit to the extent 
that Mr. Markadonatos’ counsel poorly constructed the procedural argument and 
caused it to become unnecessarily entangled with the substantive argument. The 
proper issue under a procedural argument does not depend on whether the fee is 
rational. A perfectly rational fee could still violate procedural due process if the 
procedures in place in obtaining the fee failed the Eldridge test. Of course, since 
each opinion presented by the Seventh Circuit in this matter interprets Mr. 
Markadonatos’ argument differently it is hard to rely on any one interpretation or 
summarization of his argument.         
212 Id.  
213 Id. at 562. 
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Judge Sykes turned next to Judge Hamilton’s analysis on 
standing.214 Judge Hamilton argued that Mr. Markadonatos, and 
everyone else who paid the booking fee, may challenge it simply by 
virtue of having paid it and that the arrestee’s personal circumstances 
do not matter.215 Judge Sykes admitted that Judge Hamilton’s analysis 
would be true for a facial constitutional challenge.216 However, Judge 
Sykes failed to recognize Mr. Markadonatos’ facial challenge to the 
ordinance under procedural due process, and instead believed both 
dimensions of Mr. Markadonatos’ due process claim rest on the 
substantive premise that the fee is irrational as applied to individuals 
wrongfully arrested or innocent.217  
Judge Sykes voted to vacate and remand with instructions to 
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction because Mr. Markadonatos 
lacked standing to bring the claims actually raised.218 
 
4. Judge Hamilton’s Dissenting Opinion 
 
Judge Hamilton pointed out that his opinion shares common 
ground with Judge Posner’s in that both agreed, and thus a majority of 
the court agreed, that Mr. Markadonatos had standing to challenge the 
booking fee.219 Their disagreement lied in Judge Posner’s decision not 
to decide the case presented.220 Judge Hamilton states that Mr. 
Markadonatos alleged in his complaint that his rights were violated by 
Woodridge’s actual policy, whether or not that policy complied with 
the ordinance.221 Further, there was no dispute between the parties that 
Woodridge imposed the booking fee on everyone arrested, and that the 
                                                 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. (citing Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F. 3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011). 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 563. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. This is in direct conflict with Judge Posner’s argument that Mr. 
Markadonatos challenged only the ordinance and not the policy.  
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fee was not related to the bail process.222 Judge Hamilton pointed out 
that Judge Posner had transformed an unconstitutional fee for going 
into jail into an administrative fee for getting out of jail.223 Judge 
Hamilton opined that the court should decide the case the parties 
actually presented.224  
Judge Hamilton noted that Judge Posner’s transformation of the 
case ignores the most basic constraint in deciding a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim, to treat as true the factual allegations in the 
plaintiff’s complaint.225 Mr. Markadonatos’ complaint alleged a policy 
and practice of imposing the fee based solely on the fact of arrest in 
violation of the Constitution.226 Judge Hamilton pointed to the direct 
language of Mr. Markadonatos’ complaint,227 Mr. Markadonatos’ 
counsel’s oral argument stating the money paid for release on bond 
was different from the booking fee, and a receipt228 attached to the 
complaint as facts showing that the fee imposed was for arrest and not 
for release on bail.229 Additionally, Woodridge never disputed that the 
booking fee was triggered by arrest.230 Judge Hamilton opined that Mr. 
Markadonatos alleged a set of facts that present a viable claim for 
damages for violation of his federal constitutional rights by reason of 
municipal policy and that the viability of the claim does not depend on 




225 Id. at564. 
226 Id. 
227 "The booking fee policy is procedurally and substantively unconstitutional." 
Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint ¶ 1) (emphasis added). 
228 “You are hereby notified that under Village Ordinance #5-1-12, an 
administrative fee of $30.00 is required upon completion of any custodial 
arrest/booking procedure. The Complainant named above by its Police Officer, on 
oath states that you were arrested on: [date of arrest, name, date of birth, and 
address].” Id. (quoting the text of the receipt). 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 565. 
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whether the court can interpret the ordinance better than Woodridge 
administered it.231  
Judge Hamilton further noted that constitutional avoidance was 
incorrectly applied by Judge Posner because Mr. Markadonatos was 
not seeking injunctive or declaratory relief about how Woodridge 
should administer the ordinance going forward, but he was seeking 
damages for an unconstitutional policy practiced in the past.232 
Further, Judge Hamilton noted that Judge Posner failed to cite any 
cases using the doctrine of constitutional avoidance in this context, 
and properly understood, constitutional avoidance is a mechanism for 
saving legislation for the future, not a device for wishing away past 
violations of constitutional rights.233 
Judge Hamilton looked next at the merits of Woodridge’s 
policy.234 Judge Hamilton noted the deprivations occurred at the time 
of arrest.235 The ordinance allowed no room for dispute or review.236 
The deprivation occurred based on only the say-so, and perhaps even 
the whim, of one arresting officer regardless of whether the arrestee 
was ever prosecuted or convicted, and regardless of whether the arrest 
was lawful.237  
 Judge Hamilton opined that the due process violation in this case 
was more fundamental than even procedural or substantive.238 The 
booking fee denies due process because it imposes a permanent 
deprivation of property based on the unreviewable decision of one 
police office.239 Even parking tickets are subject to administrative and 
judicial review.240 However, Woodridge’s booking fee provided neither 
                                                 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 566. 
233 Id. 
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process nor law in any recognizable form.241 Judge Hamilton 
compared the booking fee to a fee a police officer might charge merely 
for subjecting an individual to a traffic stop, a breathalyzer test, or a 
Terry stop and frisk.242 All of these types of fees would be 
unacceptable because they impose the will of the government on the 
people arbitrarily.243 Supreme Court due process jurisprudence has 
long reflected that the Due Process Clause was “intended to secure the 
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.”244 
A fee based on the unreviewable say-so of one police officer is an 
arbitrary deprivation of property.245 Judge Hamilton opined that if the 
theory is that the arrestee has done something criminal to justify the 
arrest, and therefore the fee, then that question must be answered 
through the due process provided by the criminal justice system.246  
Finally, in regards to standing, Judge Hamilton points out that 
Judge Sykes’ opinion confuses the merits of the plaintiff’s claim with 
his standing to bring it.247 Standing is an inquiry separate from the 
merits and is not a difficult hurdle to clear.248 All that must be alleged 
is an injury, personal to the person seeking judicial relief, which the 
court can redress.249 In the present matter, Mr. Markadonatos suffered 
an injury when Woodridge took his $30.250 Mr. Markadonatos alleged 
the money was taken pursuant to Woodridge’s unconstitutional policy 
of collecting the money from all arrestees.251 And a court could redress 
Mr. Markadonatos’ injury by finding the policy unconstitutional and 
                                                 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 568.  
244 Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-32 (1986)). 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 569. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. (citing United States v. Funds in the Amount of $574,840, 719 F.3d 648 
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awarding damages.252 This is all that is needed to require standing.253 
Standing does not depend on whether Mr. Markadonatos will 
ultimately prevail on the constitutional claim nor does it depend on 
whether Woodridge could have justified the fee under a different 
policy or ordinance that has not been alleged by Mr. Markadonatos or 
supported by the pleadings.254 
Judge Hamilton opined that Judge Sykes, like Judge Posner, 
attempted to resolve the case by hypothesizing a different municipal 
practice or ordinance than the one alleged.255 Judge Hamilton 
summarized Judge Sykes reasoning as believing that since Woodridge 
could have charged the fee upon conviction Mr. Markadonatos lost 
standing to challenge Woodridge’s actual policy of charging all 
arrestees at the time of arrest the moment he entered a guilty plea.256 
Judge Sykes’ attempt to rewrite Woodridge’s policy using standing is 
no more appropriate than rewriting the policy using constitutional 
avoidance.257 Under Woodridge’s policy, the due process violation 
occurred at the moment the arrestee was brought to jail and paid the 
fee for no other reason than his or her arrest.258 At that moment, Mr. 
Markadonatos, or any other arrestee, had a ripe due process claim.259 
Anything that happened after that moment is irrelevant to the 
constitutional question.260 
                                                 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
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III.    THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ADOPTED JUDGE HAMILTON’S 
ANALYSIS 
  
A. Procedural or Substantive Issue 
 
A substantial amount of discussion in this case revolved around 
the issue of whether Mr. Markadonatos’ claim is properly categorized 
as a procedural due process claim or a substantive due process claim. 
Woodridge attempted to use this to their advantage by adopting a 
strategy of divide-and-conquer.261 If the claim was limited to a 
procedural due process theory, Woodridge defended its lack of 
procedural process on the theory that there was no serious chance of 
erroneous deprivation.262 If the claim was limited to a substantive due 
process theory, Woodridge argued that Mr. Markadonatos had no 
fundamental right in such a modest amount of money.263  
In Judge Hamilton’s dissent to the en banc opinion, he argued that 
since the policy surrounding the booking fee lacked any procedure 
whatsoever, other than the unreviewable say-so of one police officer, 
that the policy raised a due process issue that was more fundamental 
then either procedural or substantive due process.264 At its heart, the 
Due Process Clause is intended to secure individuals from the arbitrary 
exercise of the powers of government.265 If such a fundamental due 
process violation can potentially slip through the cracks of procedural 
and substantive due process then perhaps some new test is needed. 
However, what seems more likely is that the procedural due process 
analysis was misapplied by the district court, that Mr. Markadonatos 
caused his claim to become unnecessarily confusing by adding the 
substantive due process claim, and that the proper analysis under the 
procedural claim was the one championed by Judge Hamilton in his 
dissent to the panel opinion.   
                                                 
261 Id. at 567. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
264 Id.  
265 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-32 (1986). 
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Judge Hamilton’s dissent to the panel opinion argued that since 
the booking fee was charged without any procedure whatsoever, it 
raised a procedural due process issue by its very nature and that the 
substantive due process issue was nothing more than a detour to 




B. “No Procedure” is Not “Adequate Procedure” Under the Due 
Process Clause 
 
As the Supreme Court noted in Eldridge, the purpose of the 
procedural due process test is to determine if administrative 
procedures are constitutionally sufficient.266 The lack of any 
administrative procedure in the face of the deprivation of property 
surely cannot be considered constitutionally sufficient or adequate.  
In Roehl v. City of Naperville,267 a similar ordinance in Naperville, 
requiring a $50 booking fee, was examined.268 The Naperville 
ordinance did not establish any pre or post-deprivation procedures.269 
The plaintiff, Mr. Roehl, was arrested and charged for driving under 
the influence of alcohol, was charged the booking fee, and later, was 
found not guilty and released from jail.270 Mr. Roehl filed a complaint 
alleging the ordinance violated his procedural due process rights and 
Naperville filed a motion to dismiss.271 
In applying the first factor of the Eldridge test, the court noted 
that Mr. Roehl’s property interest in $50 was minimal for substantially 
similar reasons to those alluded to in Markadonatos I.272  
                                                 
266 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
267 Roehl v. City of Naperville, 857 F. Supp. 2d 707 (2012). 




272 Id. at 713. 
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The court then moved to the third Eldridge factor, the 
governmental interest, noting that the analysis of the government’s 
interest would inform the discussion on the second Eldridge factor, the 
risk of erroneous deprivation.273   
The Roehl, court realized that the governmental interest varies 
based on the arrestee.274 On one end of the spectrum the government 
has a strong interest in recovering costs from individuals ultimately 
found guilty, because the governmental costs are incurred due to their 
illegal conduct.275 However, on the other end of the spectrum the 
government has a weak interest, and possibly no interest, in charging 
booking fees to arrestees who are arrested on invalid warrants 
(warrants that had been quashed but not yet removed from the system), 
individuals wrongly arrested because they were incorrectly identified 
as a person sought on a valid warrant, and individuals ultimately 
dismissed because there was an absence of probable cause for the 
arrest.276  
Finally, the Roehl court looked at the second Eldridge factor, the 
risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of substitute 
procedural safeguards.277 The court admitted that since the fee was 
charged to all arrestees the likelihood of erroneous deprivation to a 
non-arrestee is virtually zero.278 However, since the ordinance 
provided no procedural safeguards to permit arrestees to challenge the 
fee, there is a one hundred percent chance that someone who should 
not have been arrested but was will be erroneously deprived.279 The 
court then determined the probable value of substitute procedural 
safeguards.280 The court noted that it was the presence or absence of 
                                                 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 714. 
275 Id. 
276 Id.  
277 Id. at 715. 
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additional safeguards that is important to the Eldridge analysis.281 The 
court pointed to numerous cases that held that additional safeguards 
were not needed when adequate procedures were already in place.282 
The court could not hold, as a matter of law, that Naperville’s 
ordinance satisfied procedural due process since it failed to provide 
any procedural mechanism whatsoever.283  
This is the correct analysis under the Eldridge test. As noted in 
Roehl, there are numerous situations where an individual could be 
arrested when they should not be.284 This includes situations where an 
individual is arrested with probable cause but due to no fault of their 
own.285  
The holding by the district court in Markadonatos I implied that 
since the fee was charged to all arrestees regardless of probable cause 
or eventual guilt, the action of charging the fee to an individual who 
was wrongfully arrested or innocent of any crime would not be 
erroneous deprivation.286 However, that line of reasoning is incorrect 
because it fails to recognize that Woodridge’s interest could not apply 
to all arrestees equally. This is what Judge Hamilton meant when he 
opined that Woodridge’s interest could only be in charging the booking 
                                                 
281 Id. 
282 Id. at 716-17. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339-40 (1976) 
(No additional or substitute procedural safeguards were necessary when the plaintiff 
had access to detailed post-deprivation administrative procedures which would 
provide full retroactive relief); Payton v. Cnty of Carroll, 473 F.3d 845, 851-52 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (Extra procedural safeguards not necessary when bail system contained a 
number of safeguards for people who could not afford the fee at issue); Slade v. 
Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 253-54 (4th Cir. 2005) (No additional 
procedural due process safeguards necessary for pre-trial detainees who had access 
to grievance procedures within the jail to contest the fees at issue); Sickles v. 
Campbell Cnty, 501 F.3d 726, 730-31 (6th Cir. 2007) (Extra procedural safeguards 
were not necessary for the plaintiff-detainees, where they had notice of and access to 
internal grievance and post-deprivation administrative procedures)). 
283 Id. at 717. 
284 Id. at 714. 
285 Id. 
286 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos I), No. 11 C 7006, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3115, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2012).  
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fee to individuals convicted of a crime or else its interest would 
evaporate.287 Since Woodridge cannot have any governmental interest 
in charging booking fees to individuals that it wrongfully arrested, any 
depravation from such individuals would be erroneous. Thus, just as 
Naperville’s ordinance could not be held to satisfy procedural due 
process because it failed to provide any procedural mechanism 
whatsoever, Woodridge’s policy which similarly fails to provide any 
procedural mechanism whatsoever should not have been held to 
satisfy procedural due process.    
This is where Judge Sykes attempted to argue that Mr. 
Markadonatos lacked standing because he was not an individual who 
was wrongfully arrested or innocent.288 However, having removed the 
unnecessary substantive due process claim, this procedural claim is 
now clearly a facial constitutional challenge and individual application 




No Supreme Court opinion has ever held that government 
deprivation of a private interest in the absence of any pre or post-
deprivation procedures, or other safeguards, is acceptable procedural 
due process. Woodridge’s ordinance and corresponding policy failed to 
provide any procedural mechanism whatsoever, and thus, the Seventh 
Circuit should have held that there was an adequate claim against 
Woodridge for violating Mr. Markadonatos’ procedural due process 
rights. 
                                                 
287 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos III), 739 F.3d 984, 995 
(7th Cir. 2014). 
288 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge (Markadonatos IV), 760 F.3d 545, 562 
(7th Cir. 2014). 
289 Id. 
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